





1. Good-will may be sold like other personal property: Chur-
ton v. Douglas, Johns. Ch. R. 174; Banks v. Gibson, 11 Jur., Pt.
1, 680 ; Iitchcock v. Coker, 6 Ad. & El. 438; W'Vdderburn v. Wed-
derburn, 22 Beav. 84 ; Johnson v. Helleley, 34 Id. 63 ; Bradbury
Y. Dickens, 27 Id:'53; l3Ielle, sh v. K:Ceen, 28 Id. 453; Turner v.
Major, 3 Gif. 442; (ruttwell v. Lye, 17 Yes. 335; Shackle v.
Baker, 14 Id. 468; Hall v. Barrows, 33 L. J. Ch. 204; ._11c-ar-
lan v. Stewart, 2 Watts 111; Holden's Admr's. v. MeMakin, 1
Pars. Eq. Ca. (Pa.) 270; 3fusselrnan's Appeal, 62 Penn. St. R.
81 ; Williams v. W7ilson, 4 Sandf. Ch. 379: Dougherty v. Van
Nostrand, 1 Ioff. 68; Howe v. Learing, 19 How. Pr. Rep. 14.)
2. (a) The vendor of a business and of the good-will thereof,
may, in the absence of express stipulation to the contrary, set up
a similar but not the identical business, either in the same neighbor-
hood or elsewhere, and may publicly advertise the fact of his
having done so; but he must not solicit the customers of the
old business to cease dealing with the purchaser, or to give their
custom to himself: Cruttwell v. Lye, 17. Yes. 335; Cook v.
Collingridge, Jacob 607. In the decree in the latter case, which
is fully reported in Collyer on Partnership 174, Lord ELDON said
that, after a sale, the partners would be at full liberty to carry on
the same trade and business ; that those who buy the good-will,
buy it with full knowledge that it is liable to the chance of the




In lupp v. Over, 3 Brewst. (Pa.) 133, the court held that,
where plaintiff had sold to defendant the types, &c., and good-will
of The Bedford Inquirer, it was not error to reject evidence offered
by the defendant to prove that plaintiff had afterwards carried on
a rival newspaper called The Bedford Patriot, by which much of
the custom of the Inquirer was taken away.
In hurton v. Douglas, Johns. 187, the principle is well stated
by Vice-Chancellor WOOD as follows: "The authorities, I think,
are conclusive upon this point, that the sale of the good-will of a
business, without more, does not imply a contract on the part of
the vendor not to set up again a similar business himself. I cite
the expression similar business purposely, in order to distinguish the
case I am supposing from one where, as here, the vendor seeks to
set up again the identical business which he has professed to sell.
Upon the sale of the good-will of a business, the vendor is not pre-
cluded from carrying on a precisely similar business, with all the
advantages he may be able to acquire from his own industry and
labor, and from the regard people may have for him; and that, in
a place next door, for example, to the very place "where the
former business was carried on. And, upon the authorities, it is
settled that, if the purchaser wishes to prevent that step from be-
ing taken, it is his fault if he does not take care to insert provi-
sions to that effect in the deed." See also tall v. Barrows, 33 L.
J. Ch. 204; Davies v..ffodgson, 25 Beav. 177-; Howe v. Learing,
19 How. 14. In Johnson v. Helleley, 34 Beav. 63, a decree had
been made on the death of a partner for the sale of the business as
a going concern, and included therein the right on the part of the
purchaser to hold himself out as the successor of the firm of
"Samuel J. J- Sons." Upon objection made by the surviving
partner, the court decided that the particulars of sale ought to
state that the surviving partner, Tlliam J., had still a right to
carry on the same business in the same form in his own name.
(b) In Labouehere v. Dawson, Law Rep. 13 Eq. 322, the good-will
of a brewery business, and the exclusive right to use the name of
Benjamin Dawson & 0o. in connection with the business of
brewers, was sold by the defendant to the plaintiffs. The agree-
ment contained no stipulation to prevent the defendant from him-
self setting up business as a brewer. The defendant began to carry
on the business of a brewer, and by his travellers and agents so-
licited the customers of the firm of Benjamin Dawson J" Co. for
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orders. An injunction was awarded by the M. R. (Lord Ro-
MILLY) to restrain the defendant, his partners, servants or agents
from applying to any person who was a customer of the firm of
Ben jamin Dawson f- Co. prior to the date of the agreement to sell
the good-will, privately, by letter, personally, or by a traveller,
asking such customers to continue to deal with the defendant, or
not to deal with the plaintiffs.
lis lordship having stated that the case was a new one, con-
tinued: "The question is this : Was he entitled to solicit person-
ally the customers of the old firm to come and deal with him ?
Now all the cases admit that he is entitled to carry on the same
business wherever lie pleases, and to solicit customers in any public
manner that lie pleases. Then it is argued that the power of so-
liciting the whole of the public to deal with him includes the power
of soliciting any one particular person who is a member of the
public. On the other hand, the plaintiffs say this: You cannot
violate this principle, ' that if you sell a thing you are not entitled
to take away its value.' It is true that you sold it without bind-
ing yourself not to carry on the same business; yet you did
sell it, expressly including the good-will, that good-will being
the probability of the ol customers going to the new firm to
which you have sold the business. The question is, may you
go to those very persons and try to prevent their giving their
custom to the new firm? It is very true you have not entered
into an express covenant that you will not do that, but there is an
implied covenant to that effect, for a person cannot sell a tiling and
destroy the value of it. * * * I am of opinion the defendant is
not at liberty personally to solicit the customers of the old business
to come to the new business. But this does not exclude what is a
reasonable or fair solicitation of those customers; this, however, is
a matter to be determined in each particular case. * * * The
new firm, the defendant in this case, is entitled to publish any.
advertisement lie pleases in the papers, stating that lie is carrying
on such business ; but he is not entitled, either by private letter or
by a visit, or by his traveller or agent, to go to any person who
was a customer of the ol firm and solicit him not to continue his
business with the old firm, but to transfer it to him, the new firm."
Lord ROiILLY went on to say, in answer to the question: Where
are you to draw the line? that if a person were to publish circulars
in the papers which could have no meaning except as a solicitation
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of the customers of the old firm, and which would be unmeaning if
they related to the new firm, he should consider it merely a color-
able departure from what was not allowable, and should grant an
injunction.
A point somewhat similar had been decided in Pennsylvania in
1850, twenty-one years before. In Palmer v. Graham, 1 Pars.
Eq. Ca. 476, the plaintiff had been in the habit of supplying certain
persons regularly with camphine oil. He sold his horse, wagon,
cans, &c., together with the good-will of his trade, to defendant,
who agreed "to keep up said horse, wagon and route, the custom
or good-will, &c., and make such additions to the custom as lay in
his power, for the space of twelve months, and in case the money
was not paid within that time, he agreed to return the horse,
-wagon, cans, &c., and a correct and full list of every customer on
said route. Defendant did not pay the sum agreed on, and it was
agreed that the proviso of the contract should be complied with.
The horse, wagon, original list of customers, &c., 'ere returned
to the plaintiff, but the defendant continued to supply plaintiff's
old customers. KING, P. J., said: "While he professed to return
to the plaintiff his property in statu quo, he really abstracted from
it, for his own benefit, that which constituted its permanent value.
That the plaintiff could have maintained an action at law for this
breach of good faith, cannot be doubted. But has he not also the
more effective remedy in this court of compelling the specific exe-
cution of the contract by restraining the defendant by injunction
from any further violation of it ?" Injunction awarded to restrain
defendant or his servants from furnishing camphine to such per-
sons as were customers of the plaintiff at the time that the con-
tract was entered into. It will be observed that in this case it was
presumed against the defendant that all of the former customers
of plaintiff obtained by him, had been gotten improperly. The
injunction was far broader than that granted by Lord ROMILLY, as
the mischief was done, and was the result of fraud.
In Rall's Appeal, 60 Penn. St. 458, the defendant sold the good-
will of his business to the plaintiff for value. Defendant set up
the same business within a short distance of his old place of busi-
ness, the plaintiff's establishment, and advertised that he bad
removed from his old place and was continuing his former business
in a different street in the city of Philadelphia. WILLMAMS, J.,
said: " H e sold the good-will of his business to the plaintiff for a
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valuable consideration, and good fiith requires that he should do
nothing which directly tends to deprive him of its benefits and
advantages. It is clear that he had no right to hold himself out
as continuing the business which lie sold to the plaintiff, or as car-
rying on his former business at another place to which lie bad
removed." Decree granted restraining defendant "from holding
hinmself out to the public by advertisement or otherwise as continu-
ing his former business, or as carrying it on at another place."
In Angier v. Webber, 14 Allen 211, Angier, Webber and
Wakefield were partners, as wagoners between Boston and Somer-
ville. The five wagons owned by them had stands in Boston.
Similar wagons bad stands in the same and adjoining streets.
Webber and Wakefield executed bills of sale to Angier for their
share of the business, including tools, &c.; " also all the interest
and good-will in and to the teaming business now prosecuted by
them in Boston and between Somerville and Boston. And I do
covenant anti agree * * that T will not in any way do anything which
shall in anywise impair or injure the said interest and good-will in
the teaming business hereby conveyed." Wakefield and Webber
afterwards associated themselves as partners in the business of
wagoners in Boston, and purchased the right to two stands already
used and enjoyed by other persons, in close neighborhood to some
of Angier's stands, and carried merchandise for many of the former
customers of the old firm. They did not, however, solicit the
business otherwise than by procuring the stands and wagons above
mentioned. GRAY, J., on the foregoing facts, refused an injunc-
tion restraining the defendants, &c., "from soliciting for, doing or
obtaining any work, trade, custom or teaming business for or from
any of the customers or persons who, before the date of the bill of
sale, were customers of Angier & Co." The plaintiff appealed to
the full court, who granted the injunction prayed for.
This case goes far beyond any of those cited, and cannot be
sustained on principle. Tie defendants had sold the good-will of
their business to the plaintiff. This, as we have seen, did not pre-
clude them from setting up a similar business in the same place.,
They covenanted, in addition, not to do anything which should in
anywise impair or injure the said interest or good-will in the busi-
ness conveyed. This covenant was superfluous, for the defendants
were bound, in the absence of covenants, as the decisions already
cited prove, not to do anything which would injure the good-will
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of the business sold by them. It is difficult to see why a covenant
not to do an act forbidden at law should be held to have a wider
scope than its language warrants, because, unless the unauthorized
meaning were given to it, it would be superfluous. The later cases
on the subject do not appear to have been cited.
, In the recent unreported case of Burkhardt v. Burkha,'dt, in
the Superior Court of Cinciinati, the decision in Labouchere v. Daw-
son, supra 330, was followed. It was said that, though a former
partner, who had sold his share of the good-will of the firm, might
engage in a similar business and lawfully advertise that fact to tile
world, he will be enjoined from applying to any customer of the
old firm, privately, by letter, personally, or by a runner or travel-
ler, and asking him to deal with him, or to give up dealing with
the old firm.
8. (a) M7ren a partnership is dissolved by death, bank-ruptoy or
otherwise, the good-will is an asset of the firm, and should be sold
and the proceeds distribut4d among the partners.
(b) On the death of a partner, the good-will does n'ot (in equity)
go to the survivor.
(a) In the leading case of Crawshay v. Collins, 15 Ves. 218, a
partnership had been dissolved by the bankruptcy of one partner:
Hield, that the assignees were entitled, beyond an account and distri-
bution of the stock, &c., to a participation in subsequent profits, made
by the other partners carrying on the trade with the capital, good-
will, &c., as it existed at the time of the bankruptcy. Lord ELDON
said: "Another mode of determination is * * by the death of one
partner; in which case the law says that the property survives to
the others. It survives as to the legal title in many cases, but
not as to the beneficial interest. * * If the surviving partners
think proper to make that which is, in equity, the joint property
of the deceased and them, the foundation and plant of increased
profit, if they do not think proper to settle with the executor and
put an end to the concern, they must be understood to proceed
upon the principle which regulated the property before the death
of their partner." In Willett v. Blanford, 1 Hare 258, Sir J.
WIGRAM, V. C., says: "Again the whole or substantial part of
the trade may consist of good-will, leaving the renewal of contracts
with the old connection of the firm unaffected; in such a case the
good-will is the identical source of profit, which operates both
before and after dissolution. * * If * * the skill of the individual
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had been exercised as a, partner in the concern until it had created
a connection and good-will-and if, on his death, the surviving
partner, instead of giving to his estate the benefit of that good-will
by a sale of the concern, should think proper to carry on the con-
cern for his own benefit until the connection and good-will were
lost, it would not be difficult to justify a decree, which, in such a
case, should declare the estate of the deceased partner entitled to a
share of the profits accrued after his death."
.1,hellersh v. Keen, 27 Beav. 236, and 28 Id. 453. In tlne latter
report the court says : [It] "may be perfectly true that nothing
could have been more easy than to have sold it [the good-will] in
such a way that nobody would have given a penny for it. But
the court is bound to look at it in this point of view: What
it would have produced if it had been sold in the most advanta-
geous manner and under such circumstances that it would have pro-
duced the largest sum for all the parties interested." So in Brad-
bu~y v. Dickens, 27 Bcar. 53, the court, on the dissolution of a
literary partnership, ordered the right to use the name of the peri-
odical, "_Household Brords," to be put up for sale and the pro-
ceeds to be distributed together with the other firm assets. See also
Turner v. Major, 3 Gif. 442. In Williams v. Wilson, 4 Sand. Ch.
879, difficulties arose between the partners in a private insane
asylum, and one claimed the right, on a dissolution of the partner-
ship, to retain sole possession of the establishment. The Vice-
Chancellor decided that the principal value of the establishment
arose from the good-will, and that this belongs equally to all the
partners. ie ordered the sale of the lease of the premises to-
gether with the good-will to be made, and proceeds distributed, &c.
So in HIolden's Adm's v. l3eilfakin, 1 Pars. Eq. Ca. 270, it is well
said that, " it is undoubtedly his [the surviving partner's] duty at
once to make sale of all the partnership property of every kind
as it was held by the partners at the time of the death of the de-
ceased partner, or of a dissolution caused by bankruptcy, insol-
vency or otherwise, * * * and divide the balance with, &c. * * *
In all cases of a partnership at will, whether the contract was
originally of that nature, or has become so by effluxion of time or
other circumstances, a court of equity will, upon dissolution, decree
a sale of the entirety of the partnership effects, at the desire of
any of the parties."
(b). In Hammond v. Douglas, 5 Yes. 539, "the Lord Chancel-
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]or [LOUGHBOROUGH-] was clearly of opinion that, upon a partner-
ship without articles, the good-will survives, and a sale of it cannot
be compelled by the representatives of the deceased partner, being
the right of the survivor which the law gives him to carry on the
trade. It is not partnership stock of -which the executor may
compel division." This was in 1800. In 1808, Lord ELDON, in
Crawsay v. Collins, 15 Ves. 218, says he agrees with the doubt
expressed by Sir S. ROMILLY, whether this point of the judg-
ment, ascribed by his lordship to Lord LOUGHBOROUGH were good
law. In Lewis v. Langdon, 7 Sire. 421, the view of Lord ELDON
was discarded, and the Vice-Chancellor, Sir L. SHADWELL, re-
turned to the earlier decision, noticing Lord ELDON's doubt, but
not satisfactorily answering it. This was in 1835. In 1855 the
law was again declared to be in accordance with Lord ELDON'S
doubt by Sir JoHN ROMILLY, M. R., who said, in Wedderburn v.
Wedderburn, 22 Beav. 84: "The good-will of a trade, although
inseparable from the business, is an appreciable part of the assets
of a concern, both in fact and in the estimation of a court of equity.
Accordingly, in reported cases, Lord ELDON held, that a share of
it properly and of right belonged to the estate of the deceased
partner. It does not survive to the remaining partners unless by
express agreement. * * * Good-will manifestly forms a portion
of 'the subject-matter which produces profits, which constitutes
partnership property, and which is to be divided among the sur-
viving partners and the estate of the deceased partner, according
to the terms of the contract, and when that is silent according to
their shares in the concern.' Assume this state of things to exist,
that on the death of some partner in a firm possessing extensive
connection and high reputation, it was found that they had no
capital of any description except the counting-house, and that
they had liabilities to a considerable amount, and assume that the
surviving partners were, notwithstanding this, able to continue
business, to retrieve their affairs and realize large profits for many
years, is it not obvious that their profits would be wholly attribu-
table to good-will-that is to the connection and reputation enjoyed
by the firm ? In the case supposed, the estate of the deceased
partner, in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, would
be entitled to a share of the profits because he was entitled to a
share of the good-will, which does not survive to the continuing
partners." See also iSmith v. Everett, 27 Beav. 446; Holden's
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Adi.. v. 3lIe,akin, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. 274, and Howe v. Learing,
19 1 how. Pr. R. 14.
In Webster v. Webster, 8 Swanston 490, note, motion on part of
John Webster, one of the executors of James Webster, deceased,
was made for an injunction to restrain defendants, David Webster
and James Wedderburn, the twio other executors of James Webster,
from lusing the name of the testator in the trade carried on by
them in partnership.
'Te ground upon which this motion was made was, that the
defendants used the name of the testator in the trade for the pur-
pose or subjecting his estate to the consequence of the trade,
under a pretended agreement made by the testator in his lifetime,
Lord-Chancellor (ELDON). "It is impossible that using the tes-
tator's name in the trade, can.subject his name to the trade debts."
illitford. "If it has not that effect, it must be a fraud upon
the public."
Lord-Chancellor. "The fraud upon the public is no ground for
the plaintiff's coming into court." Motion refused.
In Soott v. Rowland, 26 L. T. N. S. 391, plaintiff and defend-
ant had been partners under the name of John Scott ' Co. till
1870, when the partnership was dissolved by the retirement of
plaintiff. No deed of assignment was executed, but the whole
stock in trade was sold to defendant at a valuation. Nothing was
paid for or said about the good-will. An injunction was granted
by V. 0. WICKELNS against the use by the defendant of the firm
name, who said that the case was different from that of a deceased
or bankrupt partner where no liability could attach, and that, even
assuming that the good-will was intended to be included in the sale
of the business, it would be a question whether plaintiff could con-
tinue to use defendant's name. An injunction was granted,
restraining from using plaintiff's name in connection with his
business, so as to represent that the plaintiff is a partner in the
business.
4. Good-will may be bequeathed by will.
In Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Ad. & E. 438, Ex. Ch., per TiNDAL, C.
J. "The good-will of a trade is a subject of value and price, and
may be sold, bequeathed, or become assets in the funds of the per-
sonal representatives." This doctrine was, however, denied in
lobertson v. Quiddington, 28 Beav. 529. A. and B. carried on
business as partners on premises belonging to the firm. A. died,
VOL. XXIII.-43
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having bequeathed his share of the good-will as follows: "In case
I should have power * * * to dispose of any part of the good-
'will of the business of a tailor, now carried on by me in partner-
ship with B. * * * I bequeath such my interest in the same
good-will which I may have power to dispose of (but not including
my interest in the book debts owing to the firm of [A. & B.] at my,
decease, nor any interest *in the stock in trade then belongin
thereto or in the moneys to arise therefrom) as follows :-namely,
two-third parts of such my interest in the said good-will, I give to
[C.], and the remaining third part I give to [D]." C., the plain-
tiff, gave notice to the executors in writing, requiring them to take
such steps as might be necessary to protect his interest in the
good-will of the firm of A. & B., and calling upon them to pro-
ceed to a sale of the entire good-will of the concern in order to
ascertain his share therein. C., who was one of A.'s executors, but
had not joined in proving the will, received from the two other
executors a formal written assent to his legacy. The executors
assigned A.'s share in the premises to defendant, B. C. filed a bill,
praying that the good-will of the business of the firm of A. & B.
might be sold and four-ninth parts of the proceeds of the sale
paid to him. (A. during his lifetime received two-thirds of the
profits of the business.) He also prayed for an account. The
bill was demurred to on the ground, (1) that if the good-will had
any existence apart from the stock in trade and premises, it was
part of the partnership assets, and could only be dealt with in a
suit to wind up the partnership transactions ; for that a bill
for the partial administration of the partnership assets could not
be sustained. (2) Because the executors were necessary parties;
and as there had been no allegation that the debts had been paid,
it would be a breach of trust for executors to assent to a legacy
prior to payment of debts. The demurrer was allowed. The
Master of the Rolls, Sir J. ROMILLY, said: "I fully concur in
the observations on both sides, not only that the good-will is a
valuable and tangible thing in many eases, but it is never a tangi-
ble thing unless it is connected with the business itself, from which
it cannot be separated, and I never knew a case in which it has
been so treated. I am of opinion that, even if the executors have
assented to this bequest, * * * it is not competent for a legatee
of two-thirds of a good-will of a deceased partner to file a bill
against the legatee of the remaining one-third and the surviving
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partner, who is entitled to all the rest of the good-will to have
that bequest specifically made good.
"1 1 do not express any opinion as to what may occur in a suit for
the general administration of assets, if it should appear that the
executors have, by realizing the business, made a profit by the
sale of this good-will, or whether thereupon the plaintiff may
not have a right to be paid in respect of his interest in it.
I should follow no doubt my decision in Smith v. Everett, 27 Beav.
446, in which the business had been actually sold, and where part
of the purchase-money was attributable to the good-will. That,
however, can only be ascertained, if, in the course of administra-
tion by the executors, they have been able so to deal with the busi-
ness as to make something from the good-will. Here the bill
expressly states that they have so dealt with the business premises
as to make that impossible, because they have assigned the testa-
tor's interest [in the business premises] to [B]. In this state of
things, I am of opinion it is impossible that the plaintiff can be
entitled on that mere statement to realize the testator's share of
the good-will, as against the person entitled to the other third;"
" The case of Lewis v. Langdon, 7 Sim. 421, also appears to
me to establish very clearly that the firm's name (whatever its
value may be) survives to the surviving partner, and that, con-
sequently, it could not be sold, and it is obvious that without this
it would produce no value at all. If the plaintiff thinks fit to sell
his interest, such as it is, nobody can prevent it; but certainly no
one would get anything by it."
This case decides that the bill of a legatee of two-thirds of the
good-will of a deceased partner against the legatee of the remain-
ing third and the surviving partner is demurrable. But the
expressions of the Master of the Rolls cover a wider field, and it
may be doubted whether they state the law accurately.
Good-will unquestionably is intangible, nor can it be separated
from the business; but this does not lessen the duty of the execu-
tors to realize this incorporeal asset; and if they deal with it in
such a way as to destroy its value, are they not accountable to the
full extent thereof? The same judge, in lhfellersh v. Keen, 28
Beav. 453, said: [It] "may be perfectly true in one sense that
nothing could have been more easy than to have sold it in such a
way that nobody would have given a penny for it. But the court
is bound to look at it in this point of view: What it [the good-will]
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would have produced if it had been sold in the most advantageous
manner and under such circumstances that it would have produced
the largest sum for all the parties interested." Lord RO.IILLY
seems to admit that, in a suit for the general administration of
assets, the executors might be charged by what they had actually
realized from the good-will, or according to the expressions just
quoted, by what they might have realized with due diligence.
"But," continued the Master of the Rolls, "the bill expressly
states that they have so dealt with the business premises as to
make that impossible, because they have assigned testator's in-
terest to" [B., the defendant]. The report of the case states that
the executors had assigned testator's share in the business premises
to B. But it is difficult to see why this should by itself render
the good-will of no value. Suppose the case of a newspaper-
Would a sale of the premises in which, or of the materials by
which the manual labor was performed, destroy what might exceed
the joint value of the stock a hundredfold, the value.of the good-
will-the name and subscription list? A newspaper yields, we
will -say, $50,000 net profits ; the interest on the value of the
establishment in which it is printed, machinery, &c., may not ex-
ceed that sum in value; is there any logical reason why a testator
may not order the paper and stock to be sold separately, and may
not bequeath the proceeds in different channels; and if he can
bequeath the good-will separately, why may he not subdivide it
and give a fraction to one and the remainder to another?
And because he has bequeathed the good-will specifically instead
of ordering it to be sold, would a court of equity refuse to interfere
and permit an asset of immense value to be wilfully destroyed or
wrongfully appropriated to the use of one who has no just title to
its enjoyment? A surviving partner carrying on the trade and
using the good-will of the old firm, is, as we have seen, chargeable
with a proportionate share of the profits. But what philosophy
or justice is there in a decision which decrees an account of profits
and refuses to recognise that which has produced them? Nor can
a logical distinction be taken between a legatee and personal rep-;
resentative. If the next of kin is entitled to th value of all of
the decedent's property, including the good-will, where lie has died
without a will, it surely cannot be urged that, where lie has desig-
nated the objects of his bounty, they are therefore to be deprived
of it. But Sir JOHN ROMILLY goes on to say that the case of
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Lewis v. Langdon, 7 Sim. 421, appears to him pertinent, and to
establish clearly that the firm's name (whatever its value may be)
survives to the surviving partner, and that consequently it could
not be sold; and it is obvious that without this it would produce
no value at all. Lewis v. Langdon was decided on the express
ground that the firm- name was part of the good-will, and that
good-will went to the surviving partner. This doctrine, as we
have seen, was doubted by Lord ELDON, and repudiated by Sir
JouN RomILLY, in Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, 22 Beav. 84, in the
following words: "The good-will of a trade * * is an appreci-
able part of the assets of a concern * * * in the estimation of a
court of equity. * * * Lord ELDON held that a share of it pro-
perly and of right belongs to the estate of the deceased partner.
It does not survive to the remaining partner unless by express
agreement. Good-will manifestly forms a portion of the subject-
matter which produces profits, which constitutes partnership pro-
perty, and which is to be divided among the surviving partners
and the estate of the deceased partner."
And in Smith v. Everett, 27 Beav. 446, the same judge says:
"I entertain no doubt that, if persons carry on business, and one
of them dies, a share in the good-will (where it is of any value at
all) forms part of the estate of the deceased partner, and jhis share
of it would be in proportion to his interest in the concern."
And in Iellersh v. Keen, 27 Beav. 286, and 28 Id. 453, the
same judge decided that, in regard to the good-will on a dissolu-
tion of partnership, the proper view to be taken is to ascertain
"what it would have produced if it had been sold in the most
advantageous manner and under such circumstances that it would
have produced the largest sum for all the parties interested." It
is somewhat difficult to reconcile the language of these three deci-
sions made in 1855, 1859 and 1860 respectively, with that of
_obertson v. Quiddiniqton, made in the latter year, although to what
lengths the latter case does exactly go, is, in view of the numerous
qualifications introduced, extremely difficult to say.
In MFarland v. Stewart, 2 Watts 111, it was said that the
subscription list of a newspaper was not the subject of a separate
property, but an accident of the establishment, which passes with
a sale of the materials. A. S. BIDDLE.
(To be continued.)
